
Subverting Solidarity: The Role of American Organized Labor in Pursuing United States Foreign Policy Objectives in Chile, 1961-1973

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“The pressing need in Latin America is to promote the middle-class revolution as speedily as possible... If the possessing classes of Latin America make the middle-class revolution impossible, they will make a ‘workers-and-peasants’ revolution inevitable... they will guarantee a Castro or a Perón.”

– Arthur M. Schlesinger, Special Assistant to President Kennedy¹

In the formative days of a nascent Kennedy presidency, Arthur M. Schlesinger revealed – perhaps unwittingly – the core issue that would define United States policy toward Chile for the next two decades. The ostensible goals of that policy were not markedly different from those pursued elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere or, indeed, the rest of the world: expelling Communism from neutral or U.S.-influenced regions, promoting favorable economic environments for U.S. financial interests, and showcasing American military and ideological superiority. Exacerbating and preying upon existing socioeconomic class tensions in Chilean society to further these goals were not, however, commonly deployed tactics. They display a level of sophistication and societal integration not always seen in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations. U.S. covert action in Chile is an example of a long-term, forward-thinking strategy that does not often arise in the CIA’s playbook; a strategy in which the CIA was content to bide their time for over a decade while slowly and meticulously developing a social and institutional foothold in the country. Perhaps their most critical tools for constructing this type of infrastructure were labor unions or, more specifically, American organized labor working parallel to and sometimes in concert with Chilean trade unions. By spending

¹ Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Report to the President on Latin American Mission: February 12-March 3, 1961* (Washington: March 10, 1961), 12.

years subverting these labor unions and laying the groundwork for a future war of ideology, the CIA pried open existing inter-class fissures and used them as inroads to enforce U.S. foreign policy objectives in the period preceding the overthrow of Salvador Allende.

The academic literature concerning the nature of foreign policy in the labor movement has evolved considerably over the last half century. The most generally acceptable theory is that interest in foreign affairs is inherent within the labor movement, but American organized labor worked in tandem with the U.S. government to achieve mutually desirable aims.² That is, the American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) – the domestic institution through which the CIA funneled their labor influence in Chile – developed foreign policy objectives independent from the government for the benefit of their members and the furtherance of their general mission. The government did not define AFL-CIO foreign policy but, since the two policies often coincided, the CIA worked through the organization to conduct its work covertly – work that benefitted both institutions. An excellent example of this is articulated by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD); “both the AFL-CIO and the State Department favor strengthening democratic labor unions in Latin America... which can redistribute income and bring about structural reforms in the ownership of the means of production.”³ This was meant to be a retort against an accusation that the AIFLD is little more than a tool operated by the State Department to promote its short-term goals. Instead of convincingly disproving the accusation, the AIFLD inadvertently provided an example that can be interpreted to support the accusation’s truth. None other than “Assistant Secretary of State Charles A. Meyer said that the American Institute for Free Labor Development is a reflection of the United States policy of cooperation ‘with the free and democratic trade unions of

² Kim Scipes, *AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers: Solidarity or Sabotage?* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), xxi.

³ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *Analysis of Pamphlet on AIFLD by Fred Hirsch* (April 22, 1974), 2.

the hemisphere.”⁴ Direct CIA funding of AFL-CIO efforts began long before the effort in Chile. The AFL (before merging with the CIO) established the Free Trade Union Committee to oppose Communist efforts, primarily in Europe. The scope of the AFL’s involvement on the continent after World War II involved, among other things, participating in electoral manipulation in France and Italy, an endeavor funded and directed by the CIA.⁵ In Latin America, AFL/CIA operations initially included the *Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores* (ORIT), an anti-Communist regional trade union that played a role in the CIA effort to overthrow Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 before being declared effectively defunct after the successful Cuban revolution.⁶ ORIT’s influence in the region continued to wane due to being perceived by Latin Americans as a subsidiary of the U.S. State Department after its role in the coups of both Arbenz in Guatemala and João Goulart in Brazil. The need for a reliable, competent operational arm in Latin America led the AFL-CIO to form the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).⁷

The AIFLD was formed in late 1961, ostensibly to be a training institute for Latin American union officials. At the organization’s ten-year anniversary in 1972, six prominent Latin American and Caribbean labor leaders anticlimactically declared the AIFLD’s mission to be “bread, peace, and liberty for all in the Americas and the Caribbean.”⁸ What the AIFLD lacked in convincing public relations it made up for in bureaucratic infrastructure; it removed the need for the AFL-CIO or CIA to divide their temporal and monetary resources between myriad international

⁴ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 7, no. 12 (December 1969), 1.

⁵ Scipes, *AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers*, 31.

⁶ Heraldo Muñoz and Carlos Portales, *Una Amistad Esquiva: Las Relaciones de Estados Unidos y Chile* (Santiago: Pehuén Editores, 1987), 56. Serafino Romualdi, *Presidents and Peons: Recollection of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967), 241-245. Scipes, *AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers*, 32.

⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Labor Policies and Programs*, July 15, 1968, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, S. Rep. 87-782, 9.

⁸ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 10, no. 6 (June 1972), 1.

organizations or trade unions in foreign countries.⁹ In this way, the AIFLD served as a clearinghouse of sorts; a one-stop shop for grassroots infiltration and propaganda in Latin America. As some scholars have argued, it has also served as a covert-operational arm of the AFL-CIO.¹⁰ By 1972, the AIFLD had trained over 190,000 Latin American labor leaders including 9,000 in Chile and 79 Chileans at U.S. facilities.¹¹ This vast network of potential propagandists in a region increasingly susceptible to Communist influence quickly caught the attention of the U.S. government; early in the 1960s, the AIFLD was already “becoming the organizational basis for American labor’s participation in the Alliance [for Progress].”¹² The concrete link between the CIA, AFL-CIO, and AIFLD was the cast of characters that served in AFL-CIO and AIFLD leadership positions, most of whom boasted prior or concurrent employment by various branches of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, including the CIA.

Julius Mader, author of an extensive dossier allegedly exposing over 3,000 CIA agents, claims that the CIA, State Department, Peace Corps, Agency for International Development (USAID) and other foreign affairs branches integrated their personnel regularly. He estimates that approximately 2,200 active agents were working abroad under official diplomatic pretenses.¹³ Forty-four of these agents had worked in Chile by 1968, still five years before the coup to unseat Allende. Mader identified George Meany¹⁴ and Emmanuel Boggs¹⁵ as key CIA operatives working

⁹ Fred Hirsch “The Labour Movement: Penetration Point for U.S. Intelligence and Transnationals” in Fred Hirsch and Richard Fletcher, eds., *The CIA and the Labour Movement* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1977), 7.

¹⁰ Dan Kurtzman, “Lovestone’s Cold War: The AFL-CIO Has Its Own CIA,” *The New Republic* (June 25, 1966), 21.

¹¹ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *Annual Progress Report: 1962-1972 – A Decade of Worker-to-Worker Cooperation* (Washington: AIFLD, 1972), 1. Hirsch, “The Labor Movement,” 11.

¹² American Institute for Free Labor Development, *AIFLD: Twenty-Five Years of Solidarity with Latin American Workers* (Washington: AIFLD, 1987), 2.

¹³ Julius Mader, *Who’s Who in CIA: A Biographical Reference Work on 3,000 Officers of the Civil and Military Branches of the Secret Services of the USA in 120 Countries* (Berlin: Julius Mader, 1968), 10-11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 354.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 63.

within the labor movement; Meany as AFL-CIO president and Boggs as a rather transient, shadowy figure who held multiple leadership positions in local and national labor unions before becoming AIFLD's director in Chile. One of Boggs' protégés, Leon Vilarin, is credited with leading the 1972 Chilean truckers' strike that began as a group of mine supervisors striking to protest the nationalization of the Kennecott and Anaconda copper mines – both American-owned and AIFLD members.¹⁶ The mine strike itself owed its existence to Julio Bazán, a mine administrator and fascist who called for “an authoritarian government” to execute a “massive massacre of Communists and leftists.”¹⁷ Bazán worked in concert with the National Command for Gremio Defense, a confederation of myriad professional unions funded by the AIFLD with CIA funds.¹⁸

The first person to suggest the formation of the AIFLD, Joseph A. Beirne, served as President of the Communications Workers of America – an AFL-CIO affiliate – and was a member of Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph International (PTTI), a union identified as having received CIA funds.¹⁹ Beirne was also Secretary-Treasurer of the AIFLD. The communications unions became crucially important in 1962, when AIFLD executive director William C. Doherty, Jr., a regional representative of PTTI, attempted to seize control of them after their leadership called for the nationalization of the American-owned International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, also a CIA collaborator.²⁰ Doherty, for his own part, was the figurehead of corporate interests in the AIFLD. He famously claimed that the AIFLD executive board – bursting at the seams with business leaders – showed the benefits of worker-executive cooperation and encouraged the decline in hostility toward U.S. corporate interests

¹⁶ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 27.

¹⁷ North American Congress on Latin America, “Collision Course: Chile Before the Coup,” *NACLA's Latin America and Empire Report* 7, no. 8 (October, 1973), 16-25.

¹⁸ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 26.

¹⁹ Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1969), 419.

²⁰ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 19. Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 10.

throughout Latin America.²¹ This is widely regarded as a Freudian slip of sorts, revealing as a possible ulterior motive for the AIFLD's existence the goal of dispelling "hostility of Latin American workers toward U.S. corporations."²² These links to business leaders and government agents are key to understanding the monetary flows within and through the AIFLD.

As with most government-business joint enterprises, one need only follow the money to find the influence. The paradigm of AIFLD operations is that of a tripartite alliance: government, labor, and business.²³ The funding records between the State Department and the AIFLD are particularly curious. The State Department openly provides the majority of AIFLD funds "when labor's goals and U.S. foreign policy goals coincide."²⁴ However, much of this funding comes in the form of large, vaguely written proposals that allow the AIFLD to use the money for initiatives that could not be signed off on or plausibly denied by the State Department.²⁵ Some scholars have surmised that the combination of large sums of money for which the AIFLD is held only minimally accountable and weak State Department control of the AIFLD has resulted in a foreign policy essentially being crafted by the AFL-CIO.²⁶ Funds for the AIFLD have increased each year even in the presence of documented "deficiencies in financial matters, such as misappropriation of funds... cash shortages... overdrafts... and lack of accounting records."²⁷ These fly-by-night accounting practices are characteristic of CIA activity; accounts payable are kept in only very general terms when the object of the expenditures is extralegal or publicly damning. A common government conduit of CIA funds and project contracts is the USAID, a government agency which also came to use the AIFLD as an

²¹ William C. Doherty, Jr., "AIFLD and Latin Labor Building a Modern Society," *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News* (July 1966), 3.

²² Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, 418.

²³ *Ibid.*, 416. Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 16.

²⁴ AIFLD, *Analysis of Pamphlet on AIFLD by Fred Hirsch*, 2.

²⁵ Hirsch, "The Labour Movement," 16.

²⁶ Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, 433.

²⁷ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Annual Report of the Comptroller General of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1968*, January 3, 1969, 91st Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 14, 189-191. Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, 16.

operational arm for many of its social welfare projects. In fact, of the \$15.4 million in total labor expenditures by the USAID, two-thirds finds its way into the pockets of the AIFLD.²⁸ By 1967, 89% of AIFLD funds had come from USAID contracts.²⁹ Using these USAID-facilitated procurement methods, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus has harnessed the AIFLD as its primary mechanism “for supplying technical assistance – education and training and social projects – to Latin American trade unions.”³⁰ The CIA/USAID link extends to Chile as well; the USAID designated to the CIA responsibility for representing their interests in business transactions and complementing their programs in the countryside via the *Confederación Nacional Campesina*, a national trade union of rural workers and farmers.³¹

The CNC was not the only trade union subverted by the AIFLD/CIA cooperative. The AIFLD attempted to form a confederation of labor unions to parallel the *Central Única de Trabajadores* (CUT), the Marxist-oriented confederation of blue-collar labor unions. The product was the *Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores* (CNT). The CNT failed early on and was not revived until the junta took power in 1973, but it amassed a small but significant following that would prove critical to future AIFLD operations in Chile, including COMACH, a union of maritime workers.³² The interlocking directorates characteristic of AIFLD operations are seen in the CNT as well; its president, Bernardo Ibañez, moved to Washington to become the AIFLD’s Professor of International Labor³³ and two of its founders, Hector Durán and Ernesto Miranda, came to be employed by the AIFLD in Chile.³⁴

²⁸ Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁰ Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 9.

³¹ Eduardo Labarca Goddard, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a la Intromisión Extranjera* (Santiago: Editora Austral, 1968), 182.

³² Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 19.

³³ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 1, no. 5 (November 1963), 2.

³⁴ Labarca Goddard, *Chile Invadido*, 179.

Completing the tripartite alliance were private business interests. George Meany submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations a list of 78 private corporations and businesses that contributed money to the AIFLD from 1962-1968.³⁵ Several of these, including United Fruit Company and ITT, are known CIA collaborators. In addition, as previously referenced, the AIFLD brought in undisclosed sums of money from private foundations to found and maintain the organizations. Many of these organizations are cross-referenced by *The New York Times* in a partial list of institutions cooperating with the CIA and the subsidiaries funded by those institutions.³⁶ This is the template of AIFLD/CIA operations in Latin America in the 1960s. Working through this infrastructure, the CIA could tap into existing tensions between Chilean socioeconomic classes and manipulate them for their own gain.

By the time Allende won a presidential election in 1970, these class tensions had been festering for over fifty years. Throughout the twentieth century, the Chilean economy was generally defined by typical, three-class structure. The small upper class was wealthy but unable to achieve exorbitant wealth because American corporations dominated the economy; the middle class was sizable but not overwhelmingly large and was unable to develop in terms of wealth; and the vast lower class was exceptionally poor by comparison and bore the brunt of all economic shocks.³⁷ When Allende was elected in 1970, the bottom 50% of the population accounted for only 12% of Chile's total consumption.³⁸ Chilean political history from 1920-1964 was a crucible of power struggle between these classes, with each subsequent election showcasing the gradual decay of the upper class oligarchy in favor of the middle and, eventually, lower classes. The exact

³⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *American Institute for Free Labor Development: Hearing with George Meany, President, AFL-CIO*, August 1, 1969, 91st Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 33-948, 21.

³⁶ "Units Linked With CIA," *The New York Times* (February 19, 1967), 27.

³⁷ *ITT-CIA Subversion in Chile: A Case Study in US Corporate Intrigue in the Third World* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1972), 5-8.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

development of this power struggle is beyond the scope of this paper, but the argument demands a brief chronological overview. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the *latifundium* system of rural wealth stratification caused the unprotected *campesino* (peasant) class to be controlled by wealthier landowners.³⁹ Dissatisfaction with this system, among other things, motivated the 1920 election of Arturo Alessandri, who challenged the landowning elites by showcasing the rise to power of the middle class.⁴⁰ Following economic collapse, Alessandri was followed by two decades of political upheaval before stability returned to Chile and his son, Jorge Alessandri, was elected president in 1958. Alessandri the younger was not the middle-class champion as was his father; his coalition was that of landowners and businessmen, some small entrepreneurs and merchants, and middle class members who feared social change lest Allende be elected.⁴¹ Alessandri's popularity precipitously declined during his tenure and he was replaced in 1964 with Eduardo Frei amid calls for structural reform. Frei was elected by a largely middle-class vote; the lower class sided with Allende, who saw a marked increase in support compared to 1958.⁴² Frei enacted reforms but did not engage in economic revolution, piquing the interests of the lower class but leaving them disappointed.⁴³ This disappointment finally drove the electorate to Allende, who won the presidency in 1970 over a deeply unpopular Christian Democrat candidate and the scandal-plagued Alessandri, capping the rise to power of the Chilean lower classes and fulfilling Arthur Schlesinger's prophesy to President Kennedy made nine years prior.

This is the environment in which the AIFLD and CIA set their operations in the pre-coup years. The most important of these operations was

³⁹ Armando Uribe, *The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 18.

⁴⁰ Lois Hecht Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile: Socialism, Authoritarianism, and Market Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 11.

⁴¹ Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile*, 22.

⁴² U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 5.

⁴³ Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile*, 26.

education. Traditional AIFLD education programs (two to three months in length) originally took place only at their facility in Front Royal, Virginia, but shorter programs were eventually established at AIFLD outposts in many Latin American countries, including Chile in the late 1960s. Meany claimed the Front Royal courses were “designed to train trade union teachers and technicians who can take their skills back to their respective countries to train other trade unionists.”⁴⁴ The hope was that those receiving the training would return to their unions and instill in their comrades the information with which they had been imbued in Front Royal (or in their respective countries’ “in-house” program), thereby creating a propagandist pyramid scheme of sorts. The raw numbers exhibit what appears to be a massive influence; by 1977, through these domestic and international programs, the AIFLD had trained 243,668 unionists in Latin American and the Caribbean alone, 1,600 of them in U.S. facilities. As previously referenced, approximately 9,000 Chileans were trained in these types of programs.⁴⁵ Scholars have yet been unable to reliably estimate how many Chileans were affected through secondary or tertiary interactions with these program veterans. These American-educated unionists provided the AIFLD and CIA with vast numbers of ideological subordinates already embedded within the very institutions necessary for exploiting Chilean class tensions. They had no need to forcefully insert their operatives into Chilean society; they had created a veritable army of ideological sleeper cells. They had only to organize their sympathizers into an infrastructure which they could activate and work within when necessary.

This infrastructure was the Chilean Confederation of Professionals (CUPROCH), formed in May 1971.⁴⁶ CUPROCH, in and of itself, was not a union; it shared members with other unions and was more of a

⁴⁴ Committee on Foreign Relations, *American Institute for Free Labor Development*, 7.

⁴⁵ Fred Hirsch, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or, Under the Covers with the CIA* (San Jose, CA: Fred Hirsch, 1974), 33. Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 11.

⁴⁶ Thomas F. O’Brien, *Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 255.

confederation of like-minded workers from across diverse industries.⁴⁷ It was, in essence, the AFL-CIO's second attempt at a confederation of workers after the CNT failed many years prior. It was also the administrative core of the National Command for Gremio Defense, the group responsible for organizing the truckers' strike that brought the Chilean economy to a screeching halt in August 1972. That strike was a significant step for the CIA in constructing an environment conducive to promoting a change of Chilean leadership.⁴⁸ In a classic example of interlocking personnel, the Secretary of the National Command for Gremio Defense, Jorge Guerrero, was one of the 79 Chileans trained at Front Royal.⁴⁹ He, along with Julio Etcheverry and José Estrada of ORIT, personify the AIFLD's efforts to place former students in union leadership positions in which they can be of direct service to the AIFLD and CIA; Etcheverry was the first director of the AIFLD Chilean program and Estrada served as a paid operative for the AIFLD.⁵⁰ Upon the installation of the junta, no union meetings were allowed in Chile save for those among the 26 groups connected to the AIFLD and CUPROCH.⁵¹ It is possible General Pinochet's government allowed CUPROCH to continue operations simply because its members largely joined the fight against Allende, but the connection between the CIA-supported junta and AIFLD/CUPROCH operations is convincing.

Applying this operational knowledge to the issue of class tension, a divide begins to emerge between blue- and white-collar unions and the political influences under which they existed. As Schlesinger predicted, the "workers-and-peasants revolution" was inevitable and culminated in the election of Allende. Attempting to subvert these lower-class workers would have been fruitless for the AFL-CIO and CIA; their support for Allende had

⁴⁷ Hirsch, "The Labour Movement," 26.

⁴⁸ Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: The New Press, 2003), 110.

⁴⁹ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 11, no. 8 (October 1973), 6.

⁵⁰ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 1, no. 4 (October 1963), 5. AIFLD, *The AIFLD Report* 11, no. 8, 6. Hirsch, "The Labour Movement," 15.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

become nearly unwavering by 1970 and the confederation of unions with which most of them allied themselves, the CUT, was Marxist-leaning and firmly pro-Allende.⁵² The logical strategy, therefore, was to focus their energies on non-CUT unions and professional workers which, in this case, generally meant the white-collar, middle- to upper-class workers who had consistently opposed Allende in his bids for the presidency. Of course, not all CUPROCH members fit this definition, but certainly enough to justify the generalization did comply. The AFL-CIO tacitly admitted in 1974 that CUPROCH was composed of wealthier, white-collar workers; “CUPROCH is composed mainly of technicians and professional personnel, who have as much right to organize as do blue-collar workers.”⁵³ The implication, then, is that CUPROCH was not composed of blue-collar workers, otherwise the distinction would be not only unnecessary but also misleading.

A prime example of this dichotomy is the LAN Chile airline strike of October 1972, which occurred roughly concurrently with the truckers’ strike.⁵⁴ About 90% of LAN Chile employees were represented by SEOLAN, a CUT-affiliated union, while only 10% were affiliated with CUPROCH. This 10%, however, were the pilots and “professional” workers who occupied the more highly-paid, white-collar positions. Not only was the LAN Chile strike not supported by the vast majority of employees, but it had to be forced upon them by subversive means. The AIFLD and CUPROCH used three of their LAN Chile employees to organize a pilots’ strike in which they flew LAN Chile planes into the Santiago Air Force base, thereby preventing their commercial use.⁵⁵ This was a case of a comparatively small number of professional workers using their power and resources (and CUPROCH/AIFLD affiliation) to exact an effect, disregarding the protests of the blue-collar masses. This is where the rubber meets the road; quite

⁵² *The AIFLD Report*, 20.

⁵³ AIFLD, *Analysis of Pamphlet on AIFLD by Fred Hirsch*, 8.

⁵⁴ Salvatore Bizzarro, *Historical Dictionary of Chile*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2005), li.

⁵⁵ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 29.

literally, in the case of the LAN Chile strike. After more than a decade of patience and coalition-building, the AIFLD and CIA were finally able to utilize the ideological army they had been amassing since 1961, turning the battle for control of Chilean organized labor into a proxy war over the future of the Allende administration.

Allende leveraged the Marxist-leaning CUT throughout the latter portion of his presidency to pursue his political objectives; namely, staying in office. Examples abound from both before and after the coup that exhibit the close ties between Allende and CUT-affiliated, generally blue-collar industries. Fearing the impending military uprising, Allende called on workers to “take to [the] streets” to defend his government on June 29, 1973.⁵⁶ Like a well-oiled machine, CUT mobilized its workforce, issuing a “call for ‘total mobilization of workers’ to defend” the government and “appeal[ing] for international solidarity from other workers organizations.”⁵⁷ CUT even worked directly with the media arm of Allende’s political party, *Unidad Popular* (UP), to broadcast and advertise pro-government and pro-labor messages over UP-controlled Radio Candalaria. One of these was a call to attend a rally in support of Allende on August 28. The only announced speaker was CUT Secretary General Rolando Calderón and the slogan of the rally was to be “no to a coup and in defense of the constitutional government.”⁵⁸ On September 12, the day after the coup, CUT took to Radio Candalaria once more to implore workers and *campesinos* to “occupy factories and farms” while awaiting further orders from CUT, which had seemingly turned into a paramilitary command center

⁵⁶ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *No to Dialogue?*, July 12, 1973, 2, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679138900/FCDA45BA456B43CFPQ/1?accountid=465.

⁵⁷ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *Still Waiting*, September 10, 1973, 24, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679139556/DCF475D95A0F4A8FPQ/1?accountid=465.

⁵⁸ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *Merchants Strike Again*, August 28, 1973, 2, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679140021/1F3F8D277E6141F2PQ/1?accountid=465.

by this point. In a moment of unintended and limited comic relief, the same radio broadcast kindly asked the soldiers to refrain from shouting at the workers.⁵⁹ After the coup had concluded and Allende found dead, examples continued to arise that evidenced lower-class union support for a Socialist government in Chile. Almost immediately, CUT was declared illegal by the junta, corroborating suspicions that it was behind the blue-collar worker demonstrations in support of Allende.⁶⁰ The junta also took special measures to pacify and placate these classes of workers; the tenuous new government could not afford to have the large lower class organizing to undermine the already ravaged economy. These measures ranged from simple “assurances that ‘you and yours’ have nothing to fear from [the] military” to more involved, bureaucratic maneuvering.⁶¹ The government understood the “need to protect the lower income groups in the face of the inevitably steep price increases” and, to that end, promised to pay the equivalent of five monthly wages over a three-month period, blaming the economic collapse “on the previous regime.” They additionally continued their harsh crackdown on what they considered “illegal strikes,” that being any showcase of organized labor outside that of CUPROCH and AIFLD-affiliated unions.⁶²

Allende alluded to CUPROCH and its professional membership in his final words to Chile, broadcast over Radio Magallanes, one of the few remaining leftwing radio stations left untouched by the Chilean Air Force. Quoth Allende; “I address professionals of Chile, patriotic professionals,

⁵⁹ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *Chilean Military Uprising: SITREP No. 3 – 1010 Hours*, September 12, 1973, 1, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679139822/E9B8AB2C34E14D6APQ/9?accountid=465.

⁶⁰ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 31.

⁶¹ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *SITREP #26 – 1300 Hours*, September 12, 1973, 1, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679139792/415FCCC512EC463EPQ/1?accountid=465.

⁶² United Kingdom Embassy, Santiago to PGPD Fullerton, Esq., *Chile Internal*, October 12, 1973, 1, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679061073/366AD6514EE947B4PQ/2?accountid=465.

those who days ago continued working against the sedition sponsored by professional associations, class-based associations that also defended the advantages which a capitalist society grants to a few.”⁶³ The “professional, class-based association” to which he refers is CUPROCH, the primary union conglomerate of the opposition movement. His frustration with these professional workers is merited; leading up to the coup, “nearly all major white-collar, merchant, and professional guilds [were] on strike, most on an indefinite basis,” with “little blue-collar support.”⁶⁴ As evidenced by the successful LAN Chile strike, white-collar workers did not need the cooperation of their blue-collar coworkers to bring the Chilean economy to a grinding halt. This is indicative of the highly stratified, class-based political environment exploited by the AIFLD and its affiliated unions. One of the most prolific of these affiliated unions was the Confederation of Maritime Workers (COMACH), which had also been an important member of the short-lived CNT. Its director, Wenceslao Moreno, also served on the AIFLD executive board.⁶⁵ The AIFLD worked with COMACH repeatedly over several years leading up to and immediately following the coup, providing their members with funding for numerous housing and professional development projects.⁶⁶ On one of these occasions, the AIFLD provided COMACH officers stationed in Valparaiso with material gifts and equipment, including a modern ship-to-shore radio system to enhance their communication abilities.⁶⁷ The Chilean coup of September 11, 1973 began

⁶³ Salvador Allende, “Last Words to the Nation,” *Marxists Internet Archive*, accessed April 23, 2017, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/allende/1973/september/11.htm>.

⁶⁴ United States Embassy, Santiago, *Still Waiting*, 24. United States Embassy, Santiago, *Merchants Strike Again*, 1.

⁶⁵ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 30.

⁶⁶ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 5*, no. 10 (October 1967), 6. American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 6*, no. 7 (July 1968), 4. American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 7*, no. 2 (February 1969), 6. American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 9*, no. 8 (August 1971), 4.

⁶⁷ Labarca Goddard, *Chile Invadido*, 87. American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 6*, no. 10 (October 1968), 3.

with two naval units offshore at Valparaiso, allegedly with U.S. Navy vessels present.⁶⁸

Thus ends the narrative of AIFLD/CIA cooperation in the Chilean coup. Nevertheless, the implications of this cooperation for U.S. foreign policy were far-reaching, reverberating across the region. The AIFLD, sponsored in varying capacities by the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, used training programs to institutionalize American political and social mores and eventually drew upon those ideological ties to enforce their own vision for Chilean political economy, further defining Chilean class consciousness in the process. Fred Hirsch, who began investigating these types of operations before they were even completed, concluded that “what we are dealing with is the Latin American, and specifically Chilean, directed portion of a worldwide effort to penetrate and control labour movements. This is an indispensable arm of... U.S. intelligence and covert activity.”⁶⁹ Although Latin America was a veritable theater of Communist influence in the late twentieth century, this type of strategy was implemented across the globe. Kim Scipes, a protégé of Hirsch, cites two additional examples of American covert activity dependent upon organized labor subversion: the conflict at Atlas Mines in the Philippines through the late 1980s and an attempted coup against President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela in the 1990s.⁷⁰ Consequently, an operational paradigm begins to emerge to describe the cooperation between organized labor and U.S. foreign policy officials. This paradigm hypothesizes that “American union leaders work in Latin America explicitly for the purpose of building institutions... by which the State Department can neutralize Latin American working classes who otherwise might work for revolutionary movements.”⁷¹ In Chile, it may have been the working classes themselves who were ultimately harmed by these operations, as their reward

⁶⁸ Richard Gott, “Allende’s Last Hours – Fighting to the End,” *The Guardian* (New York, NY), September 14, 1973.

⁶⁹ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 10.

⁷⁰ Scipes, *AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers*, 67.

⁷¹ Radosh, *American Labour and United States Foreign Policy*, 373.

for their efforts was a genocidal dictator who outlawed the union confederation that represented 90% of Chilean workers.⁷² Gimmicks such as selective industry denationalization and five months' wages over a three-month period were likely insufficient to buy back impassioned support of the masses, especially when the junta knew full well that skyrocketing inflation would almost certainly negate any benefit derived by these cash handouts.⁷³ Ironically, situations such as this demonstrate the need for labor unions in developing countries.

Macroeconomic implications aside, unions represent power for both those in their ranks of membership and those against whom the unions stand. While this power is their strength, it is also their vulnerability. Power makes them an attractive target for institutions looking to subvert such power in pursuit of their own goals. In Chile, the American foreign policy apparatus, including the CIA, spent over a decade locked in a long-term battle for control of Chilean workers. Bolstered by operations of the AIFLD, this long-term battle turned into a short-term proxy war between white- and blue-collar workers fighting for the presidential palace and, ultimately, the political soul of Chile.

⁷² Scipes, *AFL-CIO's Secret War Against Developing Country Workers*, 67.

⁷³ United States Central Intelligence Agency, *Security Situation in Chile; Attached to Cover Page and Table of Contents; Alternate Version Dated September 21, 1973 Appended*, September 19, 1973, 3, <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/dnsa/docview/1679140085/DA9EF75B33E54054PQ/6?accountid=465>. United Kingdom Embassy, Santiago, *Chile Internal*, 1.